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Current release: v1.6.2.
New FeatureSecurityBug FixOperational
Week of November 9th, 2026The signing-integrity proof is now bound to the key it authorizes. Pairs with the governance engine 1.3.x. Upgrade the HSM driver first, then the governance engine: a 1.5.x driver cannot verify a 1.3.x proof. The manifests change only by their image tag, except the OSO backend (executor) manifest, described below. On OSO, restart the frontend before the backend, with no ceremony in flight.New Feature:
  • Signing integrity on OSO. The OSO backend (executor) verifies the signing-integrity proof against the key it holds, before the HSM signs. Its manifest gains --signing-integrity-public-key and a signing-integrity volume: point the volume at the directory that holds the governance engine’s pubkey.pem, or remove both if you use no proof producer. Your OSO plugins must relay the operation’s message_signature and attestation_kid fields. The OSO frontend (forwarder) refuses the signing-integrity options at startup: remove them from its manifest.
  • Signing integrity without a governance engine. --bik-signing-integrity-public-key makes the driver accept proofs produced by DFNS, for organizations that do not run a governance engine. It is mutually exclusive with --signing-integrity-public-key: a driver trusts one proof producer, and refuses to start with both.
Security:
  • Proofs bound to their key. The signing-integrity proof covers the public key of the key it authorizes, and the driver checks it against its own key store, including the derived child key for HD requests. A proof cannot authorize a signature with another key. A request whose key cannot be resolved is refused.
Bug Fixes:
  • Keys stored uncompressed sign under key-bound proofs. Driver releases before 1.3.0 stored secp256k1 public keys uncompressed, pre-generated keys included. The driver reads them compressed wherever it uses them, and finds a key by either form. Stored keys are not rewritten.
  • Keys refused without an EP11 login session. When an IBM EP11 domain refuses a key because no login session is open, the driver reports it with a clear reason, the HSM refuses the key without an EP11 login session, which the driver never opens. The signature then goes to another driver of the key store that can use the key, or fails with that reason. Applies to signing and HD key derivation.
Operational:
  • IBM EP11 domains must accept keys bound to no login session. The driver never opens an EP11 login session. Disable FIPS-session mode on every domain of the cluster (enable control point XCP_CPB_ALLOW_NONSESSION), then send the transfer again.
  • Governance engine 1.2.x proofs during the transition. The driver still accepts the proofs of governance engine 1.2.x, which do not cover the key, and logs legacy raw-message proof accepted as a security event on each one. After you upgrade the governance engine to 1.3.x, check that this warning stops. A future driver release removes this fallback.
  • On OSO, a proof that does not verify is refused after its ceremony: approvers can approve a document that is then not signed.
Bug FixSecurity
Week of November 2nd, 2026Patch on the 1.5 line. Redeploy all your driver images. The manifests change only by their image tag. Pairs with the governance engine 1.2.x, with 1.2.3 recommended.Bug Fixes:
  • Keys sealed under another master key. When an HSM does not hold the master key a key was wrapped under, for instance in an HA cluster whose HSMs do not share their master key, the driver reports it with a clear reason, the key is sealed under a master key this HSM does not hold. The signature then goes to another driver of the key store that can use the key, or fails with that reason. Applies to signing and HD key derivation. The HSMs of a key store must still share the same master key: fix the master-key setup, then send the transfer again.
  • OSO eventing. A document denied or timed out in the OSO pre-confirmation queue is handled as a pre-confirmation event. Applies to deployments with OSO eventing enabled.
Security:
  • eMudhra intermediate CAs distrusted. The driver’s connections that trust public certificate authorities, such as its PostgreSQL key store, refuse any certificate chain through the compromised eMudhra intermediates. The emSign ECC Root CA - G3 is removed from the bundled roots and from the images’ certificate store. The driver’s mTLS link trusts only its configured CA and was not exposed.
  • rustls is updated to 0.23.46, clearing four advisories. None is reachable in the driver’s configuration.
Bug FixOperational
Week of September 28th, 2026Fixpack line on top of 1.5.0 (covers 1.5.1 through 1.5.4). Same signing-integrity model and manifests as 1.5.0. Pairs with the governance engine 1.2.x.Bug Fixes:
  • Multi-input transfers complete through OSO. A transfer that spends several inputs signs one hash per input; each is now handled as its own OSO operation, with its own document to approve and its own signature returned, instead of being collapsed into one, which had left such transfers unable to complete.
  • A pre-generated secp256k1 key with an uncompressed public key now reaches the backend. Keys stored uncompressed by older driver releases are compressed before the proxy pushes them, so the wallet appears instead of silently never being created. Ed25519 keys were unaffected.
  • The OSO forwarder rides out the air-gap window. During the backend phase of a ceremony the forwarder is cut off the network, often longer than the retry timeout; it now retries the proxy indefinitely instead of exiting and losing the operations it held in memory.
  • A request sent while the forwarder is offline waits for it. The proxy remembers that a key store is served by an OSO forwarder and answers 202 while the forwarder reconnects, instead of failing wallet creation or a transfer with a final error.
  • The forwarder picks up replaced TLS certificates without a restart, re-reading its CA, certificate, and key before each connection to the proxy.
Operational:
  • The discontinued IBM HPCS backend is removed from the driver and CLI images. Native IBM EP11 and every other backend are unchanged; only an HPCS deployment needs to move to EP11. Removing the bundled IBM client also clears that library’s CVE entries from the images.
New FeatureOperationalSecurity
Week of August 17th, 2026A minor release: a new transport option, a first-class asynchronous workflow, and a robustness rollup of the proxy-to-driver link.New Feature:
  • HTTP/1 transport between driver and proxy, including through an HTTP CONNECT corporate proxy, for environments where a long-lived bidirectional stream is not available end to end. Selected on the driver with --transport grpc-http1; the default is unchanged and the proxy serves both.
  • First-class asynchronous workflow. Human-gated operations, OSO in particular, are answered as soon as the request is accepted, with the result delivered when the ceremony completes; an operation keeps one identity across retries, so asking again never starts a second ceremony. A result that took days to produce is still deliverable.
  • OSO eventing (opt-in). When OSO pushes document events to the forwarder, a denied or timed-out document aborts its operation immediately instead of waiting out the timeout. Off by default.
Operational:
  • The proxy-to-driver link was reworked: a driver reports its own capabilities, version, and HSM liveness; a sick HSM stops receiving work at once and is trusted again only after three consecutive good checks; an operation in flight survives a link flap or driver restart; and a cluster keeps serving while it is being upgraded, so the fleet can be rolled progressively.
  • A single Thales Luna call now derives a whole HD path.
Security:
  • The signing-integrity check stays on the forwarder’s side of the air gap, where the trust context exists, rather than being relayed across it.
  • Every HTTP surface is gated on its method as well as its path, and an OSO document aborted after confirmation raises an exposed-signature security log.
New FeatureBlockchain supportOperationalSecurity
Week of August 3rd, 2026Releases are now numbered hsm-X.Y.Z (no v prefix). The previous entry, v0.1.46, corresponds to 1.1.0. This entry covers everything delivered since: 1.2.0 through 1.4.2.HSM vendor support updates:
  • AWS CloudHSM support added, with a deployment runbook. The driver now advertises whether EdDSA is available on the backend.
  • Thales Luna V1 (SKS) backend added alongside the existing V0 backend, with on-token HD derivation.
  • IBM EP11: on-token HD derivation.
HD wallets (BIP-32 / SLIP-0010):
  • HD key generation and signing: generate an HD master key, sign at a derivation path, and derive child public keys with the new derive_public_key RPC. Supported on Thales Luna (V0 and V1) and IBM EP11. Ed25519 derivation is hardened-only. Not available on the OSO path.
Keystore:
  • Persistent key storage: HD master keys can live directly on the HSM partition (located by CKA_LABEL) instead of as wrapped blobs in the database. Persistent drivers are HD-only, and a new capabilities RPC reports the driver’s storage mode. The legacy sealed mode remains the default.
Secrets and authentication:
  • HashiCorp Vault secrets retriever added.
  • New Vault authentication providers: in-cluster Kubernetes service account and AWS IRSA.
  • The HSM PIN can be supplied as a Docker Compose secret file (USER_PIN_FILE) instead of an environment variable. USER_PIN keeps working; the two are mutually exclusive.
Security:
  • Pre-signature validation gate: the driver can verify the intent authorizing a signature (payload-hash binding and signing-user proof) before the HSM signs.
  • Auto-renewing mTLS server identity for the proxy and secrets retriever, with health exported as OpenTelemetry metrics. The TLS pack can carry only the CA when auto-renew is on.
  • Governance-engine signature attestation passed to the OSO plugin.
  • Fail-closed input handling: exact signing-scheme matching (no silent ECDSA fallback), plus signature-length and maximum-input-size checks.
  • destroy_all is gated out of production binaries, production images are distroless, and the Thales driver runs as non-root by default.
  • Bundled IBM pkcs11-grep11 updated 2.6.11 to 2.6.15, removing 35+ CVEs from the driver image. OpenTelemetry and rustls-webpki updated for upstream advisories.
Operational:
  • Distroless production images for hsm-driver and hsm-cli, with all vendors bundled. The previous image ships as a -debug variant for field diagnosis.
  • Structured logs carrying trace_id and span_id, propagated from incoming traceparent headers (Datadog-compatible).
  • hsm-cli disaster recovery: HD key generation, signing, and public-key derivation in persistent mode without a running proxy.
  • arm64 build of hsm-proxy.
  • New database migrations must be applied before start, for the driver and, for the first time, the proxy. HD support adds keys.chain_code; the proxy adds derivation_path to its signature cache.
New FeatureOperationalSecurity
Week of May 25th, 2026HSM vendor support:
  • Securosys Primus CloudHSM support added.
Operational:
  • Database migrations now run automatically on startup (Postgres), with a flag to disable them.
  • Response caching added to the HSM proxy.
  • hsm-cli is now shipped as a separate image.
  • HPCS (IBM grep11) library updated to 2.6.11.
New FeatureOperational
Week of May 4th, 2026HSM vendor support:
  • IBM EP11 support added: multi-card init, secure-key concept, EdDSA and ECDSA generate/sign, pre-generation.
  • Thales HSM support added (including Cloud Luna), with a dedicated runbook.
  • OpenCryptoki integration reworked, then removed in favor of the higher-level HSM interface.
Keystore:
  • SQLite added as a keystore option, with strict tables and a read-only mode.
  • HA SQLite mode added.
  • Postgres migrations reorganized into a dedicated subfolder.
Key pre-generation:
  • Pre-generation of keys supported on startup, with topup capability.
  • Pre-generation supported in pkcs11-executor mode.
Signing:
  • Sign by public key supported as an alternative to signing by key_id.
  • Signing integrity verification using ed25519.
  • Returned and stored public keys are now compressed.
Operational:
  • New hsm-cli for HSM operations without a proxy connection.
  • New bench command on the driver CLI.
  • Async flow: driver can return pending processes to the proxy REST API.
  • Multi-platform hsm-proxy images (amd64 and s390x).
  • Version printed at hsm-driver and hsm-proxy startup.
OperationalBug Fix
Week of January 5th, 2026Operational:
  • Documented HSM keystore creation in pregen mode.
Bug Fixes:
  • Client cert parsing: customer names containing dots are now accepted.
  • Client cert domain handling is now dynamic.
Operational
Week of December 22nd, 2025Operational:
  • Client stale timeout is now a configurable parameter on hsm-proxy.
  • Proxy can drop driver connections that have gone stale.
  • IBM runbook updated with HA SQLite instructions.
Initial Release
Week of December 15th, 2025First release of the DFNS HSM signer tracked in this changelog.
Last modified on November 13, 2026