Why Dfns uses passkeys
Dfns uses passkeys exclusively for user authentication. Passkeys are based on the FIDO2/WebAuthn standard and use public-key cryptography instead of shared secrets like passwords.The problem with passwords and traditional 2FA
Passwords can be stolen in data breaches, guessed, or phished through fake login pages. Traditional 2FA methods (SMS codes, TOTP apps) are also phishable: attackers can create proxy sites that capture both the password and the 2FA code in real time. SMS-based 2FA is additionally vulnerable to SIM-swapping.How passkeys work
- Registration: Your device generates a cryptographic key pair. The private key stays on your device and never leaves it. The public key is sent to Dfns.
- Authentication: Dfns sends a one-time challenge. Your device signs it with the private key. Dfns verifies the signature with the public key.
- No shared secret. The private key is never transmitted. A server breach exposes only public keys, which cannot be reversed to derive private keys.
- Origin binding. Keys are cryptographically bound to the domain they were created for. If you visit a phishing site on a different domain, your browser refuses to use the key. Phishing becomes impossible by design.
- Strong by design. Each passkey is a unique, cryptographically strong credential. No password reuse, no weak credentials.
- Inherently multi-factor. Using a passkey combines “something you have” (the device) with “something you are” (biometric) or “something you know” (device PIN), in a single step.
- Immune to credential stuffing and brute force. There are no passwords to guess or reuse across services.
Hardware security keys
Dfns supports software passkeys (stored in your device’s secure enclave, keychain, or password manager) and hardware passkeys (stored on a dedicated physical device like a YubiKey). Both are secure. For managing significant assets, we recommend hardware keys. Hardware keys provide cryptographic isolation: the private key is generated, stored, and used entirely within the device’s tamper-resistant secure element chip. It never touches your computer’s memory or storage. This matters because:- Physical separation. Even if your computer is fully compromised by malware, an attacker cannot extract or use the private key.
- Physical presence required. Signing requires a physical touch on the device, preventing automated or remote attacks.
- Strong possession factor. An attacker would need to physically obtain your hardware key and know its PIN to use it.